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Dependent development in South America: China and 
the soybean nexus. 
 
Abstract 
 
This article examines the expansion of the soybean complex in South America and the role of 
Chinese firms in expanding their presence in different sectors of the oilseed complex. The 
growth in trade relations between the two parties has been built on the export of primary 
commodities from South America and the import of Chinese manufactures ± a trade pattern 
that reproduces core-periphery dynamics identified by dependency theory scholars. Of 
particular importance in this bilateral trade is soybean, a crop that has been consolidated as 
the main export for several South American countries, fuelled by growing demand from China. 
7KLVDUWLFOHH[SORUHV&KLQD¶VUROHLQWKHJOREDOSROLWLFDOHFRQRP\DVDNH\DJUL-business player 
and the implications for new relations of dependency by studying the strategies deployed by 
Chinese firms to increase their influence in the governance of the soybean nexus. 
 
Keywords: China; Latin America; dependency; commodities; trade; agribusiness; sino-
latinoamerican relations.  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In its 2016 Policy Paper, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs emphasised that the 
UHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQFRXQWULHVRI/DWLQ$PHULFDDQGWKH&DULEEHDQDQGWKH3HRSOH¶V5HSXEOLF
of China (from now on, China) is based on a µFRPSUHKHQVLYHDQGFRRSHUDWLYHSDUtnership of 
HTXDOLW\PXWXDOEHQHILWDQGFRPPRQGHYHORSPHQW¶0LQLVWU\RI)RUHLJQ$IIDLUVRI3HRSOH¶V
Republic of China 2016). This document confirmed in writing what was already apparent, 
namely the increasing importance the region has for China. This was further evidenced by the 
two state visits to Latin America by President Hu Jintao in 2004 and 2008, the two visits by 
President Xi Jinping in 2014 and 2016 (the latter visit establishing the China-CELAC 
(Community of Latin American and Caribbean States) Forum), and the recent state visit to 
Argentina and Panama during the 2018 G20 Summit. After decades of limited connections, 
&KLQD VHHPV WR KDYH EHJXQ D QHZ SKDVH RI µRYHUW FRXUWLQJ¶ ZLWK WKH UHJLRQ DQG IRVWHULQJ
increasingly extensive economic ties (Piccone 2016: 1).  
&KLQD¶VH[SDQGLQJSUHVHQFHLQ/DWLQ$PHULFDKDVEHHQWKHVXEMHFWRIPXFKGLVFXVVLRQ
in Latin American academia and media. The growing role of China in the region raises many 
questions. Is China an alternative, anti-imperialist partner (McKay et al. 2016a)? Are we 
ZLWQHVVLQJ WKH HPHUJHQFH RI D µ%HLMLQJ FRQVHQVXV¶ WKDW PD\ UHSODFH WKH µ:DVKLQJWRQ
FRQVHQVXV¶6OLSDN",V&KLQDSURGXFLQJQHZUHODWLRQVRIGHSHQGHQF\-HQNLQV"
The nature and volume of trade relations between China and Latin America support this core-
periphery characterisation. However, dependency theory can help us see beyond the trade 
EDODQFH DQG XQGHUVWDQG KRZ &KLQD¶V HPHUJHQFH DV WKH GULYHU RI GHPDQG IRU DJULFXOWXUDO
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commodities and its efforts to ensure supply have created dependent development in South 
$PHULFD QRW RQO\ LQ WHUPV RI WUDGH GHILFLWV RU DEVROXWH JDLQV EXW LQ OLPLWLQJ WKH UHJLRQ¶V
capacity to autonomously determine its development path. This article highlights the growing 
participation of Chinese firms and investments in different sectors of the soybean complex, and 
their role in reproducing the satellization of South American economies and deepening 
GHSHQGHQF\E\OLPLWLQJWKHFDSDFLW\IRUWKHUHJLRQ¶VDXWRQRPRXVGHYHORSPHQW 
Analyses of contemporary China-Latin America relations through the lens of 
dependency theory have mainly focused on exchange statistics, that is, on the composition and 
volume of trade balances. While this offers important insights into the general nature of this 
relationship, these accounts rely on a conception of dependency that is closely linked to 
structuralist analyses and focus largely on the balance and the composition of trade, namely, 
the manufactures for primary resources dynamic. Such approaches overlook how China has 
attempted not just to create uneven exchange relations with South America, but also extend its 
control over segments of the markets that connect these economies. A focus on the struggles 
to govern different stages of production can offer a more in-depth understanding of the 
mechanisms of dependency that characterise the contemporary global order. The core-
periphery dynamic that results is not just one created by asymmetries in exchange, but in the 
capacity and autonomy of the periphery to define its own terms of development. 
 This article focuses on the case of soybean to analyse these new modalities of economic 
relations between China and Latin America. The production and trade of soybean is the fastest 
growing economic activity in some of the largest countries in South America, such as 
Argentina and Brazil, and it makes up the biggest component of their agricultural exports to 
China. As of 2016, 48% of soybeans and soybean by-products (cake and oil) are exported to 
China, 25% to the European Union (FAOSTAT, 2017), and the rest chiefly to South East Asia. 
As such, soybean exports to China have become a crucial source of profit, foreign exchange 
reserves, and overall economic growth for the region. Several authors have dubbed this the 
µVR\EHDQFRQQHFWLRQ¶RUµVR\EHDQQH[XV¶7XU]L:LONLQVRQHWDOLQGLFDWLQJWKH
centrality of the commodity for understanding this international relationship. Concurrently, 
soybean has become a crucial food commodity for the Chinese economy, functioning as animal 
feed for a livestock industry that serves a growing population with improving food preferences. 
Even more importantly, the uninterrupted supply of agricultural goods is a top priority for the 
Chinese government, as the risk of social turmoil linked to food insecurity is taken extremely 
seriously by Beijing (Freeman, Hoslag and Weil, 2008; Zha and Zhang, 2013). However, it is 
SUHFLVHO\ WKLVXQGLVWXUEHGDFFHVV WR VR\EHDQ WKDWZDV WKUHDWHQHGE\ WKH µ%DWWOHRI WKH
%HDQV¶GXULQJZKLFK&KLQHVHVR\EHDQSURFHVVLQJFRPSDnies suffered huge financial losses 
due to price fluctuations on the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT), and were subsequently taken 
over by large agribusiness traders. This article argues that China responded to this crisis by 
seeking to ensure access to different levels of the soybean value chain, through four key 
strategies: (a) land purchases for soybean production; (b) corporate take-overs; (c) 
infrastructure investments, and (d) control of biotechnological innovations.  
 This article employs qualitative research methods, namely the analysis of data collected 
through over 50 elite interviews in Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay, as well as newspaper 
articles and public reports, secondary data, and descriptive statistics. The interviewees 
belonged to three groups: former and current civil servants and cabinet members from different 
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Ministries in charge of policies linked to the agricultural sector; academics and experts on 
agricultural trade; and members of unions or associations of agricultural production and 
employees or officials from agribusiness companies, both domestic and transnational. The 
ILHOGZRUN¶VIRFXV on South America provides a revealing but partial perspective into the nature 
of Chinese involvement in this region through the soybean chain. Future research on this issue 
would require further fieldwork interviews in China in order to provide more insight into the 
link between policy decisions and business strategies in the soybean market.1 The paper is 
organised as follows: it will first give an overview of the China-Latin America relationship and 
how dependency theory has contributed to its conceptualisation; second, it will explore the 
µVR\EHDQQH[XV¶connecting the two regions; and thirdly, the article will provide an analysis of 
different strategies pursued by China in expanding its influence over the soybean complex. 
This article proposes a renewed look at dependency theory as a useful framework to understand 
the complexities of China-Latin America relations.  
 
 
CHINA, LATIN AMERICA, AND DEPENDENCY  
 
A significant body of literature has analysed the different effects of the long commodity boom 
beginning in 2000 in Latin America (Burchardt and Diez, 2014; Gudynas, 2009; Svampa, 
2013). With some exceptions (see Burges 2017; Ellis 2009; Gallagher 2016), the role of this 
commodity boom in fostering greater economic integration between Latin America and China 
has received less attention. The long commodity boom of the early 21st century, it has been 
argued, was largely the result of the rising demand for energy and food staples by the emerging 
economies, and amongst these, China in particular (Baffes and Haniotis 2010). Simultaneously, 
since the 1990s, China has increased its diplomatic and economic ties with Latin America ± 
chiefly through its expanding trade relations, facilitated by its 2001 entry into the World Trade 
2UJDQLVDWLRQ:LVHDQG4XLOLFRQL&KLQD¶VUROHLQGULYLQJXSJOREDOFRPPRGLW\SULFHV
and its growing economic ties with Latin America, has had two important results for the 
economic makeup of Latin America: the increasing penetration of Latin American markets by 
competitively priced Chinese manufactures, and the growing concentration of primary goods 
in Latin American exports to China.  
On one hand, these impacts have been unevenly distributed between South and 
Central/North America. Countries in the north of Latin America, chiefly Mexico and certain 
Central American countries, have experienced increasing competition from Chinese imports 
such as textiles and electronics (Wise and Quiliconi 2007: 411), as imports to Latin America 
from China rose from 2% in 2000 to 16% in 2014 ± the vast majority of which were low-, 
medium-, and high-technology manufactures (OECD 2015: 93). On the other hand, the region 
has become a key supplier of raw material and agricultural exports to China (Wise and 
Quiliconi 2007). This dynamic has given resource-rich Latin American countries a unique 
opportunity for growth in the context of favourable terms of trade. GDP growth in the region 
increased from below 1% in 2002 to 6% in 2003, and remained above 4% until 2010 - with the 
exception of 2009, due to the impact of the global economic crisis (ECLAC 2014). Other 
indicators also reflect the positive impacts upon Latin American economies, with foreign debt 
levels as a percentage of GDP halving from almost 40% in 1999 to 19% in 2011, and foreign 
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direct investment (FDI) levels more than doubling in the same period of time - from US$72 
billion in 2000 to US$153 billion in 2011 (CEPALSTAT 2017).  
However, there is also evidence that this trade relationship has fostered the re-emergence 
of export-oriented models based on the extraction of natural resources in Latin America, and 
in South America particularly. Mining, oil and shale gas, agro-foods and biofuels have been 
consolidated as fundamental sectors of South American economies, both for their high 
profitability and as source of royalties or export taxes. Exports to China, as a share of Latin 
$PHULFD¶VWRWDOH[SRUWVJUHZIURPLQ000 to 10% in 2013, 75% of which were natural 
resource commodities (OECD 2015: 93; Sevares 2007). As mining and oil extraction have 
increased their role in the exports of Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela, agricultural 
commodities such as soybean and sugar have become essential to the current accounts of 
Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay. Nevertheless, the size of agriculture as a share of GDP 
decreased for both Argentina and Brazil - the largest exporters of soybean in the region - 
between 2003 and 2016 (World Bank, 2017). This is due to the fact that the soybean complex 
generates the development of related services and industries, such as crushing and the 
production of soybean oil and meal. This dynamic has been conceptualised as an expression of 
WKHµUH-primaULVDWLRQ¶RI6RXWK$PHULFDQHFRQRPLHV0F.D\HWDOE. An extensive body 
of literature has explored the socio-economic and environmental impacts of the resulting 
natural resource extraction ± RUµH[WUDFWLYLVP¶± in the region, as well as the accompanying 
technologies, such as the extensive utilisation of genetically modified (GM) crops (Garcia 
Lopez and Arizpe, 2010; Lapegna, 2017; Leguizamon, 2016; Fearnside, 2001; Greenpeace 
2006; Otero and Lapegna, 2016).2  
2YHUDOOWKHJOREDOFRPPRGLW\ERRPDFFHOHUDWHGWKHH[SDQVLRQRI&KLQD¶VWUDGHUHODWLRQV
with Latin America. While many Latin American countries have experienced a tremendous 
improvement in their terms of trade, with positive implications for economic growth, there has 
been a tendency towards an over-reliance of South American economies in particular on 
primary goods, as they have come to occupy a greater portion of exports to China. Yet in 
addition to trade imbalances, China has also pursued more direct mechanisms of control to 
µORFN LQ¶ WKLV XQHTXDO HFRQRPLF UHODWLRQVKLS 7KLV G\QDPLF WKLV DUWLFOH ZLOO DUJXH LV EHVW
understood through a critical engagement with dependency theory. 
 
 
Theorising this phenomenon: Dependency revisited? 
 
Several influential accounts have framed China/Latin America relations in a positive light by 
pointing to the impact of this relationship on the ODWWHU¶Vterms of trade. Gallagher (2016: 3, 6) 
ZULWHV WKDW µ/DWLQ $PHULFD¶V &KLQD %RRP PDUNV D QHZ HUD RI HFRQRPLF KLVWRU\ LQ WKH
AmeULFDV¶ZKHUHE\µ&KLQDFDPHWRWKHUHVFXHDWOHDVWIRUPDQ\6RXWK$PHULFDQFRXQWULHV¶
However, as mentioned above, others have analysed this relationship in less rosy terms, 
focussing on the role of China in the re-primarisation of Latin American economies, the 
emergence of new core-periphery relations, and the resulting social, environmental, and 
democratic implications (Sevares, 2007; Jenkins, 2012; Slipak, 2014).  
 &KLQD¶VLQFUHDVLQJUROHLQWKHUHJLRQKDVSURPSWHGWKHHPHUJHQFHRIDQHZODQJXDJHRI
dependency in Latin America. This rapidly expanding presence has led many to discuss the 
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UHJLRQ¶V µVLQR-GHSHQGHQF\¶ 2SSHQKHLPHU  0DQULTXH  DQG HYHQ SXVKHG WKH
([HFXWLYH6HFUHWDU\RI(&/$&WRZDUQDERXW WKHµULVNVRIDQHZGHSHQGHQF\¶XSRQ&KLQD 
(Clarin, 2011). Dependency theory emerged in the 1960s in response to the failures of the 
structuralist approach. Although internally heterogeneous (see Palma, 2009), dependency 
WKHRU\FULWLFLVHGVWUXFWXUDOLVP¶VIDLWKLQWKH/DWLQ$PHULFDQERXUJHRLVLHWRrescue the region 
from underdevelopment, and instead argued that the core-periphery dynamics observable in 
North-South economic relations were inherent to capitalism (Cardoso and Faletto, 1979; Frank, 
1967). The domestic bourgeoisie was not to be understood as a source of potential 
development, as modernisation theory had insisted, but rather they should be seen as rent-
VHHNHUV ZKR EHQHILWHG IURP WKH FRUH¶V H[SORLWDWLRQ RI WKHLU FRXQWULHV $FFRUGLQJ WR WKLV
approach, the peripheral economies of the Global South were locked in a position of 
dependency, as they depended on primary goods exports to the Global North, while relying on 
the latter for industrial manufactures. Such a global imbalance was not a resolvable aberration, 
but rather an inevitable result of the capitalist system.  
For Frank, this unequal dynamic divided countries into µFRUH¶± or µmetropolis¶ - and 
µSHULSKHU\¶ - RU µVDWHOOLWH¶. The former signifies advanced economies that import primary 
commodities from the latter, in exchange for industrial manufactures at favourable terms of 
trade. The distinction between core and periphery applies not only to countries, but cities and 
regions too can be subject to SURFHVVHV RI µVDWHOOL]DWLRQ¶ )UDQN   6DWHOOLWHV RU
peripheries are thus enmeshed in a dynamic that limits their development (ibid). As Amin has 
argued, the economic development of these zones tends to be driven by processes of 
globalization, rather than autonomous national projects (Kvangraven, 2017: 16). The process 
of capitaODFFXPXODWLRQLQWKHSHULSKHU\LVDUHVSRQVHWRDQµLPSXOVH¶RUDGHPDQGLQLWLDWHG
by the core (Amin, 1974: 12), and a transition away from this peripheral model would imply 
moving towards a more autonomous form of development (1974: 16). 
Variants of dependency theory ± SDUWLFXODUO\ )UDQN¶V LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ DQG ,PPDQXel 
:DOOHUVWHLQ¶V world-systems theory ± have been criticised for a number of shortcomings. 
Brenner (1977) argues that Wallerstein implicitly shares key assumptions with Adam Smith 
and classical economy theory, namely an understanding of capitalism as a world system of 
trade and a corresponding division of labour. Consequently, dependency authors ± particularly 
Frank ± failed to understand capitalism as a system of production and overlooked the role that 
class structures play in determining underdevelopment. Frank himself recognised this criticism 
(1974), and while he analysed national bourgeoisies in his later writings, other dependency 
scholars have more successfully addressed this shortcoming. In particular, Cardoso and Faletto 
(1979: 75) highlighted how the differential relations between latifundistas, agricultural 
capitalists, mine owners, merchants, and bankers in different countries has important 
consequences for dependent development. ThHVHDXWKRUVSURSRVHQRW VRPXFKD µWKHRU\RI
XQGHUGHYHORSPHQW¶ EXW D µPHWKRGRORJ\ DGHTXDWH IRU WKH VWXG\ RI FRQFUHWH VLWXDWLRQV RI
GHSHQGHQF\¶3DOPD 
 Drawing from this theoretical tradition, several contemporary scholars have 
characterised ChLQD¶VQHZUHODWLRQVKLSZLWK/DWLQ$PHULFD as relations of dependency or even 
neo-imperialism (Wilkinson et al. 2016: 729; McKay et al. 2016b: 604). Sevares (2007) 
advised caution when examining WKHUHJLRQ¶VULVLQJJURZWKUDWHVVLQFHLPSURYHGWHUPVRIWUDGe 
derive from higher commodity prices rather than an increase in manufacturing exports. Sevares 
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concludes that the trade relationship is substantially asymmetric, with China exercising a 
double pressure ± on primary commodities, as the main importer, and on manufactures, as the 
principal exporter ± as well as reproducing investment policies similar to that of Britain in the 
19th century (ibid). Similarly, Jenkins (2012) provides strong evidence of the deep 
asymmetries governing China-Latin America trade relations, and thus characterises these 
relations as ³dependent´, while still pointing out that the United States (U.S.) remains the 
hegemonic power in the region. Finally, Slipak (2014: 119) draws directly from dependency 
theory, by first establishing that CKLQD FRQVWLWXWHV D µFRUH¶ HFRQRP\ DQG VHFRQGO\ E\
LGHQWLI\LQJDµOLQNRIVXERUGLQDWLRQ¶EHWZHHQ&KLQDDQG/DWLQ$PHULFDIURPZKLFKWKHIRUPHU
clearly benefits. Nevertheless, Slipak points out that dependency theory requires certain 
adjustments in order to capture the current realities of this relationship and that the core-
SHULSKHU\ELQDU\ ODFNV WKHQXDQFHQHFHVVDU\ WRDGHTXDWHO\FRPSUHKHQG&KLQD¶VQHZJOREDO
role.   
Analysing China±Latin America relations through the lens of dependency is useful in 
moving beyond the South-South Cooperation rhetoric proposed by Chinese elites and 
welcomed by their Latin American counterparts, and in unpacking the imbalances perpetuated 
by these relations. However, by focussing on the immediate trade balance, these authors tend 
to overlook deeper mechanisms of dependency operating within the China-Latin America 
relationship. The work of Dos Santos is instructive for rectifying this blind spot. Dos Santos 
(1970) argues that a form of µWHFKQRORJLFDO-LQGXVWULDO¶GHSHQGHQF\emerges when developing 
FRXQWULHV¶ nascent industrial sector becomes reliant on the foreign currency earned by the 
export sector to import industrial inputs and technology. Countries therefore become locked in 
to an export-oriented economy and consequently lack the capacity or autonomy to transform 
their productive matrix. While some countries may manage to develop their own capital-goods 
industries, foreign capital tends to play a prominent role in these sectors, limiting the autonomy 
of peripheral economies in determining their development trajectory (Dos Santos 1970: 233; 
Kay, 1989:150).  
'RV6DQWRV¶ZRUNKLQWVDWDEURDGHUSRLQWQDPHO\WKDWdependency is sustained not only 
by unequal terms of trade, but by unequal control of resources and capacities. By emphasising 
WKHH[FKDQJHRIJRRGVOHVVDWWHQWLRQKDVEHHQSDLGWRLVVXHVVXUURXQGLQJ&KLQD¶VHIIRUWVWR
expand its influence over primary coPPRGLW\SURGXFWLRQLQWKHUHJLRQ&KLQD¶VSULYLOHJHGUROH
is not limited to its place as one of the main trade partners of these countries, but it has also 
been consistently expanding its presence in different stages of production. Through several 
strategies, Chinese companies have been extending their scope of control over the production, 
processing, and trade of soybean in Latin America, thus promoting a form of dependency that 
is missed by analyses that fetishise the makeup of current account surpluses. While imbalances 
in the structure of trade do reveal a dependent political economy between Latin America and 
China, attempts to increasingly permeate every link within the commodity chain have deepened 
the satellization of areas in Latin America and limited the capacity for autonomous 
development. Within these relations of dependency, imbalances cannot be addressed through 
industrial and trade policies alone, as the dominance of the core power is enmeshed throughout 
all the stages of the productive system.  
Certain theoretical developments that emerged from dependency theory, namely 
:DOOHUVWHLQ¶V world-systems theory, have highlighted the utility of focusing on commodity 
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FKDLQVXQGHUVWRRGDV µQHWZRUN[s] of labour and production processes whose end result is a 
ILQLVKHG FRPPRGLW\¶ +RSNLQV DQG :DOOHUVWHLQ   7KLV LQ WXUQ KDV OHG WR WKH
emergence of Global Commodity Chains (GCC) and later Global Value Chains (GVC) 
perspectives, as an approach to map the geographically-extensive production linkages for 
particular commodities. Although these approaches are valuable in understanding different 
DFWRUV¶VWUDWHJLHVLQJOREDOSURFHVVHVRISURGXFWLRQWKLVDUWLFOHIRFXVses instead on processes 
of market governance, rather than the intra-firm governance that GVC analyses tend to 
highlight. The following sections explore &KLQD¶V strategies to govern the international soybean 
market.  
 
 
THE SOYBEAN NEXUS: THE CENTRALITY OF SOYBEAN TO CHINA-LATIN 
AMERICA DEPENDENCY 
 
The incredible rise in Chinese consumption and ChiQD¶VUHOLDQFHRQWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOPDUNHW
for supply of soybean KDYH FDXVHG WKH RLOVHHG¶V JOREDO SULFH WR VRDU &RLQFLGLQJ ZLWK
technological and productive improvements, &KLQD¶VJURZLQJGHPDQGhas fostered a massive 
expansion of soybean production in South America, especially in the Southern Cone. These 
FRXQWULHV¶ H[SRUWV KDYH EHFRPH GRPLQDWHG E\ WKLV FURS DQG WKH\ KDYH DV D UHVXOW EHFRPH
extremely reliant on soy for foreign currency reserves. The case of soy, then, is fundamentally 
at the core of this dependent relationship.  
Originally an Asian crop, soybean was introduced to the Americas at the beginning of 
the 20th century (USDA ERS, 2017). As a rich source of vegetable protein, soybean has many 
uses. It is directly processed for human consumption; used as oil for biofuel; employed as meal 
for livestock feedstuff; and recent research has increased the possibilities for its use as an input 
in industrial processes to produce rubber. These multiple uses make soybean a flex crop, one 
that can be switched from one supply chain to another with relative ease, which makes it an 
DVVHW RI LQFUHDVLQJ LPSRUWDQFH IRU GLYHUVH HFRQRPLF VHFWRUV )XHOOHG E\ LWV µIXQGDPHQWDOO\
IOH[LEOH¶TXDOLW\2OLYHLUDDQG6FKQHLGHUVR\EHDQKDVULVHQWREHFRPHRQHRIWKH
most important agricultural commodities today. World production of soybean in 1994 was 
around 136 million tonnes, with a harvested area of over 62 million hectares. By 2016, 
production had increased by over 150% and the harvest area had grown by almost 90%, 
covering more than 1 million square kilometres (FAOSTAT, 2017). Moreover, soybean leads 
global commodity trade in terms of value, with over 130 million tonnes worth almost US$50 
billion traded in 2015 (FAOSTAT, 2017).  
The most important South American agricultural producers have a significant domestic 
capacity to crush soybeans and process them into meal and oil. Argentina, for example, 
processes almost 70% of its total soybean production (J.J. Hinrichsen S.A., 2014), while Brazil 
follows with 45% (ABIOVE, 2017). In fact, Argentina is a key player in the soybean oil market, 
contributing 40% of exports worldwide (FAOSTAT, 2017). Paraguay and Uruguay have also 
begun expanding their crushing capacity in the last five years. However, China has 
demonstrated a strong preference for imports of raw soybeans. The only soybean by-product 
that features in Chinese-Latin American trade is oil, which in 2013 constituted just 4% of Latin 
American agricultural exports to China (OECD, 2015: 97).  
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Several elements have contributed to the rapid expansion of soybean production, one of 
WKHVHEHLQJWKHHPHUJHQFHRIDµWHFKQRORJLFDOSDFNDJH¶WKDWFRQWULEXWHGWRWKHSHUFHSWLRQRI
the crop as an efficient and safe investment (Phélinas and Choumert, 2017). This package is 
composed of Genetically Modified (GM) seeds, agrochemical nutrition, no-till or direct 
sowing,3 and high mechanisation (ibid7KHGRPLQDQW µSDFNDJH¶KDVEHHQ WKDWSDWHQWHGE\
Monsanto as the soybean variety Roundup Ready (RR), which is resistant to their weed killer 
Roundup, based on glyphosate. Approval of GM crops in Latin America has been key in 
initiating the rapid spread of the crop, and it is embedded in the consolidation of the neoliberal 
food regime and the associated dominance of transnational agribusiness companies (Otero & 
Lapegna, 2016). Argentina was the first one to do so in 1996, followed by Brazil in 2005 (after 
a difficult struggle between the Ministry of Agriculture on the one side, and social movements 
and the Ministry of Environment on the other3) (Motta, 2016), and Paraguay licensed GM crops 
in 2004.4 After all countries had legally accepted GM varieties, the success of the technological 
package in boosting profitability for farmers encouraged its rapid spread and today it dominates 
agricultural production in the region. However, the soybean production model has also 
incentivised an intensification of land use, increasing monocropping ± and shifting away from 
crop rotation systems ± and requiring a smaller labour force, with its consequent socio-
economic impacts (Phélinas and Choumert, 2017). This package is also significant in terms of 
PDUNHW VKDUH 0RQVDQWR¶V SDWHQW RYHU JO\SKRVDWH H[SLUHG LQ  DQG VLQFH WKHQ &KLQD
became one of the largest producers and exporters of the pesticide, providing 60% of global 
supply, with Brazil and Argentina constituting important destinations for this product 
(Research and Markets, 2018; Pucci, 2017).  
&KLQD¶VSURGXFWLRQRIVR\EHDQKDVEHHQVWDEOHDQGhas even experienced some periods 
of growth since the 1960s (FAOSTAT, 2017). However, its domestic production has not been 
sufficient to address its own demand. Myers and Jie (2015: 7) suggest that the Chinese 
JRYHUQPHQW¶VSULRULWLVDWLRQRIWKHGRPHVWLFSURGXFWLRQRIULFHwheat, and corn, fundamental 
IRU WKH FRXQWU\¶V JUDLQ VXIILFLHQF\ RYHU VR\EHDQ KDV IXHOOHG WKH JOREDO ERRP LQ WKH
commodity. In fact, the rise of soy as a flex crop and as a valuable agricultural commodity is 
LQH[WULFDEO\OLQNHGWRFKDQJHVLQ&KLQD¶VSDWWerns of consumption. As one analysis estimates, 
the grains:meat/fish:vegetables/fruit ratio changed from 8:1:1 in 1980 to 4:3:3 in 2005 (Myers 
DQG-LH$VHYLGHQFHRI WKH LQH[WULFDEOH OLQNEHWZHHQVR\EHDQ¶V ULVHDQG&KLQHVH
demand, WWF reported tKDW&KLQD¶VFRQVXPSWLRQRIVR\EHDQLQFUHDVHGIURPWRRYHU
million tonnes between 2000 and 2009, and Chinese imports are expected to have increased by 
almost 60% by 2022 (WWF, 2014). China imported 69 million tons of grain and 1.4 million 
tons in soybean oil in 2014, while the European Union received over 12 million tons of soybean 
and 19 million tons of soybean meal in the same period (Foreign Agricultural Service/USDA, 
2014). According to the OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook 2013-2022 (2013), production of 
oilseeds in general is expected to increase by 26% over the next decade, through a combination 
of re-distribution of land use in favour of oilseeds and increased yield. Increasing demand for 
soy, both for Chinese consumption (and other developing countries such as India) and as 
biofuel, reinforces a tendency for oilseed prices to increase in the medium term, consolidating 
the FURS¶V profitability (OECD/FAO, 2013: 141). With regards to Chinese-Latin American 
relations, the importance of soybean cannot be overstated: 28% of all Chinese agricultural 
imports originate from Latin America, 77% of which are soybean grains (OECD 2015).  
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Soybean production is key both for South American economies in general and for their 
relationship with China. There is an intimate connection between the economic performance 
RIWKHFRXQWULHVRIWKH6RXWKHUQ&RQHDQG&KLQD¶VGHPDQGIRUVR\EHDQ,QRWKHUZRUGVJURZWK
in South American countries is to a large extent dependent on soybean exports and 
consequently, on trade of this oilseed with China. The emergence of China as a core economy 
in the global political economy and the expansion of production networks implies the 
development of new relations of dependency that go beyond trade and entail the control of 
land, production processes, financial investment, and regulations, thus determining the terms 
of development of South American countries. The next section will explore these processes, 
and highlight how these attempts to control access and supply of resources is rooted in efforts 
from China to break with its own dependence on external powers. 
 
 
&+,1$¶6*52:,1*35(6(1&(,17+(*/2%$/62<%($1&203/(; 
 
)ROORZLQJWKHWUDXPDWLFµ%DWWOHRIWKH%HDQV¶LQLQZKLFK&KLQDZDVEDGO\EXUQHGE\
global derivative markets and Western agricultural conglomerates, China has attempted to 
extend its governance of the global soybean industry through a variety of multiscalar strategies. 
These strategies, taken together, have engendered relations of dependency between China and 
South America ± dynamics of control that cannot be ignored by analyses of Sino-Latin 
American dependency.  
 
 
7KHURRWVRI&KLQD¶VGHVLUHWRJRYHUQWKHVR\EHDQFRPSOH[7KHµ%DWWOHRIWKH%HDQV¶ 
 
Food security in China has historically meant grain security, which included cereals, coarse 
grains, and beans - including soybean (Zhan, 2017). However, while transitioning towards a 
market economy, after joining the WTO in 2001, China decided to liberalise the soybean 
market, and the oilseed became the most liberalised product in the Chinese economy. It was 
during this process that soybean was dropped as a grain security priority and was instead 
µredefined as an industrial crop¶ (Schneider 2014: 624). As a result, imported soybean 
indirectly contributes to food security through its role as an input for livestock production.  
Soybean became a key element in the meatification of diets in China (Schneider, 2014: 
625), and consequently on the perception of progress that the government pushed, as urban 
middle and upper classes moved towards higher protein diets (Schneider with Sharma, 2014). 
While liberalising soybean trade - with negative consequences for domestic soybean producers 
(Hairong et al., 2016) - China has displayed a determination to strengthen its domestic soybean 
crushing industry, which suffered a huge crisis in 2004, following the so-FDOOHGµ%DWWOHRIWKH
%HDQV¶2OLYHLUDDQG6FKQHLGHU7KLVFULVLVXQIROGHGDIWHU&KLQHVHLPSRUWHUVIROORZLQJ
a significant rise in demand for soybean, turned to the CBOT to purchase soybean futures as a 
way of hedging against the risk of further price increases. However, this spike in demand and 
speculative flows pushed the futures contracts to an abnormally high price, and Chinese buyers 
ended up acquiring these contracts at a 30-year high (China Daily, 2009). At the time of cashing 
in the contracts, soybean prices had dropped by almost 30% and many buyers defaulted on 
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WKHLU FRQWUDFWV 7KH µELJ IRXU¶ DJULEXVLQHVV WUDGHUV NQRZQ DV WKH $%&'V $'0 %XQJH
Cargill, Louis-Dreyfus), took Chinese companies to GAFTA in London, which ruled in favour 
of the transnational traders, hence resulting in Chinese importers paying at least US$1.5 billion 
more than the market price, according to the Chinese Academy of Sciences (Wen, 2008; China 
Daily, 2009; Oliveira and Schneider, 2016: 171).5 The sudden shift in price was considered to 
be a result of changing reports from the U.S. Department of Agriculture, which first suggested 
low global stocks of soybean, while later a record harvest in the US prompted the sudden drop 
in prices (see Oliveira, 2018b). The main benefLFLDULHV RI WKLV µVR\EHDQ FULVLV¶ ZHUH WKH
transnational agricultural trading companies, which came to acquire the domestic Chinese 
processing companies that had suffered financially from the price volatility. At the end of this 
process, the ABCDs were thoXJKWWRFRQWURODURXQGRI&KLQD¶VFUXVKLQJFDSDFLW\:HQ
2008). 
 This traumatic event shaped the following development of the soybean complex in 
China, as the state became invested in the recovery and expansion of the domestic crushing 
industry (OliveLUD DQG 6FKQHLGHU   7KH JRYHUQPHQW¶V VWUDWHJ\ WR VXSSRUW WKLV
UHFRYHU\ DOORZHG IRU GRPHVWLF FRPSDQLHV WR LQFUHDVH WKHLU VKDUH LQ WKH FRXQWU\¶V VR\EHDQ
industry; however, rather than reacquire the non-foreign-owned soy mills, this was done by 
greDWO\LQFUHDVLQJWKHFRXQWU\¶Vtotal crushing capacity. This led directly to a situation whereby 
China developed a massive crushing overcapacity. In 2012, the volume of soybeans processed 
LQ&KLQDZDVOHVVWKDQKDOIRIWKHFRXQWU\¶VRSHUDWLQJDELOLW\ZKLFK meant there was enough 
LGOH FDSDFLW\ WR SURFHVV $UJHQWLQD¶V HQWLUH SURGXFWLRQ YROXPH LELG ,Q RWKHU DUHDV RI
DJULEXVLQHVV SURGXFWLRQ VXFK DV SRUN WKH LQGXVWU\ LV OHG E\ µGUDJRQ KHDG HQWHUSULVHV¶
encouraged by the government (Schneider, 2017). As Schneider mentions, soybean is an 
H[FHSWLRQLQ&KLQHVHDJULEXVLQHVVµDQH[DPSOHRIKRZWKHVWDWHGRHVnot want to proceed with 
DJULFXOWXUDOGHYHORSPHQW¶7: 11, emphasis in original). In its trade with South America, 
China has demonstrated a strong preference for the importation of raw soybeans. Soybean 
producers in Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay, have stated that they believe this is part of a 
purposeful national policy by China to only import soybeans in their natural state, in an attempt 
to keep all industrialisation and added value within China.6  
The Chinese authorities are understood to be wary of a sudden change in the control of 
the importation and processing of soybean for domestic consumption ± either as edible oil or 
as input for poultry production. Zha and Zhang (2013) have argued that, even if not part of the 
grain sufficiency policy, WKLVFRPPRGLW\LVNH\WR&KLQD¶VVWUDWHJ\RIIRRGVHFXULW\DQGKDYLQJ
this sector controlled almost in its entirety by foreign-owned companies following the events 
of 2004 raised considerable concern. <HWSHUKDSVPRUHLPSRUWDQWO\&KLQD¶VµREVHVVLRQ¶ZLWK
food security (Zha and Zhang, 2013) is linked to concerns over the potential social unrest that 
could follow a food shortage or high food prices (Freeman, Hoslag and Weil, 2008). One 
element RIVR\EHDQ¶Vimportance for domestic security is related to its role as meal-stuff for 
livestock, considering the &KLQHVHSRSXODWLRQ¶Vrising consumption of protein, namely in the 
form of meat. Imports of soybean then become a key component in the meatification of diets 
DQGWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VHIIRUWV to compensate for the lack of democratic openness with socio-
economic progress.   
&KLQD¶VFKDQJLQJVWUDWHJ\LQWKHVR\EHDQVHFWRUfollowing WKHµ%DWWOHRIWKH%HDQV¶FDQ
also be analysed as an attempt to break from the domination by foreign capitals in one of the 
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FRXQWU\¶VPRVWLPSRUWDQWVHFWRUV,QWKHDIWHUPDWKRIWKHVR\EHDQFULVLVFRPPHQWDWRUVLQ&KLQD
REVHUYHG WKDW µ6RXWK $PHULFD SURGXFes soybean, China buys soybean, and the US sells 
VR\EHDQ¶+DLURQJHWDO6; Zhou, 2015). This implies a certain unease over the control of 
the soybean market by US-based corporations, and the need for China to develop direct trade 
linkages with South American producers. Indeed, Oliveira (2018bGHVFULEHVRQHRI&KLQD¶V
first attempts to directly trade soybeans with Brazil, cutting ABCDs out of the process, even 
EHIRUHWKH%DWWOHRIWKH%HDQV&KLQD¶VGHSHQGHQF\upon US-based transnational companies 
had also extended to agro-technology. A report from Greenpeace in 2009 warned that &KLQD¶V
lack of ownership of GM rice varieties could have detrimental FRQVHTXHQFHVIRUWKHFRXQWU\¶V
food security (Hairong et al., 2016).  
The expansion of domestic crushing capacity was not the only strategy through which 
China has attempted to protect itself from future threats to its access to agricultural goods. In 
particular, four outward strategies stand out as the most important mechanisms through which 
China has sought to insure against another devastating disruption to its soybean supply: large-
scale land purchases; acquisitions of and investments in Latin American agricultural 
companies; infrastructure investments and financial support; and increasing veto power over 
µWHFKQRORJLFDOHYHQWV¶ 
While we must be careful not conceptualise the various Chinese actors and institutions 
as a monolith, acting in a unitary manner, the identification of these strategies nevertheless 
DWWHPSWVWRVKRZIROORZLQJ6FKQHLGHU¶VDQDO\VLVRf the pork industry (2016), that there exists 
a clear intention on the part of the Chinese state to expand the global reach of Chinese 
FRPSDQLHVDQGVHFXUHDFFHVVWRUHVRXUFHVXSRQZKLFKWKHFRXQWU\KDVDµVWUDWHJLFGHSHQGHQFH¶
(Wilkinson et al., 2016). The four strategies to govern the soybean chain discussed below each 
involve ERWKSXEOLFDQGSULYDWHDFWRUVVXSSRUWLQJ3D\QH¶VREVHUYDWLRQRI WKHpublic/private 
fluidity that characterises contemporary global governance (2005: 78). Yet these strategies are 
also fundamentally rooted in &KLQD¶Vµ*R2XW¶SROLF\, expressed by the Minister of Agriculture 
Han Changfu in a 2010 DQQRXQFHPHQW µWKH WLPH DQG FRQGLWLRQV DUH ULSH IRU WKH FRXQWU\¶V
DJULFXOWXUDOFRPSDQLHVWR³JRRXW´¶0\HUVDQG-ie, 2015: 8). According to Zhang and Cheng 
WKLVLVSDUWRI&KLQD¶V*OREDO$JULFXOWXUDOVWUDWHJ\: µSULYDWHVHFWRUVDQGHQWHUSULVHV
DUHHQFRXUDJHGWREHWKHPDLQIRUFHVRILQYHVWPHQWLQIRUHLJQDJULFXOWXUDOUHVRXUFHV«7KH
PDLQWDVNIRU&KLQD¶s overseas agricultural investment lies in establishing a global system for 
production, marketing, transportation, storage, processing and manufacturing¶  
emphasis added). This is achieved with government support, and in some cases the direct 
support of investment banks, such as the Chinese Development Bank or the China Export-
Import Bank (Eximbank).  
 
 
Strategy I: Land purchases  
 
$WWHPSWVWRDFTXLUHODQGIRUDJULFXOWXUDOSXUSRVHVIRUPHGDQLQLWLDOHOHPHQWLQ&KLQD¶VVWUDWHJ\
to govern global agricultural production in general, and soybean in particular. This has been 
documented by NGOs and think tanks as part of a broader phenomenon that extends beyond 
China-Latin America relations, as it is related to the global race for access to cheap food (See 
GRAIN, 2012; Franco et al., 2012; Hall, 2011; LandMatrix, 2018), and has also been linked to 
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WKHJOREDOµPHDWLILFDWLRQRIGLHWV¶6FKQHLGHU7KHUHLVDODFNRIDFFHVVLEOHLQIRUPDWLRQ
on the scale of land purchases, which makes it difficult to reach a definite figure regarding how 
much land has been acquired by foreign states or transnational companies. In the case of 
&KLQD¶V SXUFKDVH RU OHDVLQJ RI ODQG LQ /DWLQ $PHULFD HVWLPDWHV UDQJH IURP  WKRXVDQG
hectares, reported by the Inter-American Dialogue, to more than one million hectares, reported 
by GRAIN (Myers and Jie, 2015). It is thus unclear the scale of Chinese land acquisition in 
Latin America, and whether China stands out ± or even leads ± in this trend compared to 
countries from the Global North. While attempts by Chinese capitals might have received more 
coverage and attention, foreign investors from the US and Europe have also been active in 
these processes (Oliveira, 2018a). However, these strategic movements, although not always 
successfXOLQGLFDWH&KLQD¶VFRQWLQXRXVHIIRUWVWRHQVXUHDQGIXUWKHUFRQWUROWKHXQLQWHUUXSWHG
supply of soybean. In his analysis of China-Brazil linkages, Oliveira (2018a) suggests that 
China has attempted to by-pass ABCDs in Brazil and hence avoid the dependence upon US-
based companies. Increasing investment in land, and hence direct access to production, would 
allow China to challenge WKH FRQFHSW WKDW µChina buys soybeans, South America produces 
soybeans, and the US sells soybeans¶. Land acquisitions in South America allow Chinese 
companies to increase their market share and their overall influence over production and trade.  
Some of these land purchases have been on a small scale and in association with domestic 
companies, but overall these constitute attempts by China to increase its presence in the region. 
In 2011, the Chongqing Grain Group (CGG), a private Chinese trading company based in 
Chongqing, announced a US$850 million purchase of 200,000 hectares in the north-eastern 
Bahia region of Brazil, for the production and processing of soybean (Zha and Zhang, 2013: 
468; Maissonave and Magenta, 2011). This project was partially supported by the Chinese 
Development Bank (CDB) and, according to the mayor of Chongqing, CGG holds a majority 
stake in the project, while 30% is owned by their Brazilian counterparts (Maissonave and 
Magenta, 2011). There have also been reports of CGG purchasing land in a northern region of 
Argentina (Anon., 2012); the private investment group Shanghai Pengxin Group has acquired 
small extensions of land in Bolivia for soybean production (Ellis, 2014: 38; LandMatrix, 2018); 
the Hong Kong-based Pacific Century Group reportedly manages farms in Paraguay through 
its subsidiary Calyx Agro (formerly a Louis-Dreyfus company) (GRAIN, 2011; Infocampo, 
2012); and there have been expressions of interests by the private company Sanhe Hopeful 
Grain & Oil and the state-owned China National Agriculture Development Group in 
purchasing land in the state of Goiás, Brazil (Oliveira, 2018a: 119). Furthermore, neither the 
CGG project in Bahia, nor that of Beidahuang in Argentina mentioned above have been 
permanently cancelled, and in fact the totality of unconfirmed or stalled deals covers around 
1.5 million hectares. Of these, around 900 thousand hectares are dedicated to the production of 
soybean (Myers and Jie, 2015).  
Efforts by Chinese companies to acquire land for production of soybean have been met 
with resistance from local populations and the government, and made even more difficult with 
the legislation passed in 2010 and 2011 in Brazil and Argentina, respectively, with the aim to 
limit the acquisition of agricultural land by foreign investors (See Perrone, 2013). Resistance 
IURPORFDODFWRUVDQGDFWLYLVWJURXSVKDVUHVXOWHGLQWKHVWDOOLQJRI&**¶VLQYHVWPHQWLQ%DKLD
which as of 2014 had barely advanced. While BaKLD¶VJRYHUQPHQWFLWHGEXUHDXFUDWLFSURFHVVHV
as the source of the delay, some analysts have pointed out that the hold-up may have derived 
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from concerns over the acquisition of large extensions of land by a foreign company (Stauffer, 
2014). The delay gave the impression of the abandonment of the project. However, Oliveira 
observed that field visits to the site indicated a de facto RZQHUVKLS E\ &**¶V %UD]LOLDQ
subsidiary, Universo Verde Agronegócios (Oliveira 2018a: 118, 119). In Argentina, the 
Beidahuang 1RQJNHQ*URXS¶VDWWHPSWWRSXUFKDVHKHFWDUHVRIODQGLQWKHVRXWKRIWKH
country for grain cultivation and export to China was suspended due to pressures from 
resistance groups and demands from the national government to limit foreign purchases of land 
(Zha and Zhang 2013: 468; Clarin 2011).  
While resistance from both the government and local movements to extensive foreign 
purchase of land has been the main obstacle to the completion of these operations, recent 
political changes in some of these countries may accelerate the completion of these 
acquisitions. In 2017, Brazilian President Michel Temer proposed legislation to relax the 
conditions for acquisitions of land by foreign capitals in Brazil (Rosa 2017). While 7HPHU¶V
successor, Jair Bolsonaro, was prone to anti-China rhetoric during his electoral campaign, he 
has also been open about his disdain for environmental protection and the need to support 
agribusiness capital, which will likely lead to an expansion of the oilseed industry (Sengupta 
2018). In Argentina, PUHVLGHQW 0DXULFLR 0DFUL¶V DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ VLJQHG VHYHUDO DJUHHPHQWV
ZLWK&KLQDLQDWWKHWLPHRI;L-LQSLQJ¶VVWDWHYLVLW7KHVHDJUHHPHQWVLQFOXGH: Dµ-RLQW
Action Plan 2019-¶, which covers trade, investment, agricultural and infrastructure issues, 
among others; a US$9 billion currency swap deal; investments in infrastructure and financing 
for infrastructure; and an expression of interest by China Grain Reserves Ltd. to purchase 
double the amount of soybeans and soybean oil that they bought in 2017 (Villafañe 2018). 
 
Strategy II: Acquisitions and investments 
 
$VHYLGHQFHGE\WKHµ%DWWOHRIWKH%HDQV¶WKHELJIRXUDJULFXOWXUDOWUDGLQJFRPSDQLHV
play a dominant role in the global soybean and agricultural economy, trading commodities 
throughout the value chain. However, the rapid development and expansion of soybean has 
also enabled the growth of other companies, usually in countries that are producers of soy, at 
all stages of the production chain: from seeds, fertilisers and other agrochemicals; to the 
processing and trading of the crops. As mentioned above, China has been incentivising Chinese 
companies ± many of them state owned ± to expand globally as a strategy to both secure the 
supply of soybean (and other agricultural products) and enhance its capacity to control prices 
WKURXJKLWVµ*RLQJ2XW¶SROLF\. 
Examples of this include the acquisition of NIDERA, a transnational agribusiness 
company originally founded by Dutch and Argentine capitals, by the state-owned China 
1DWLRQDO&HUHDOV2LOVDQG)RRGVWXIIV&RUSRUDWLRQ&2)&2&KLQD¶VODUJHVWJUDLQWUDGHU. This 
acquisition began in 2014 and was completed in August 2016 when the Chinese company 
bought the remaining 49% share of NIDERA (Sheppard, 2016). Additionally, also in 2014, 
COFCO finished the purchase of Noble Group, a grain trader and commodity supply manager 
based in Hong Kong. While these purchases have a global reach, as they consolidate the 
&KLQHVHFRPSDQ\¶VSUHVHQFHLQWKHZRUOGJUDLQPDUNHWWKH\DOVRKDYHVLJQLILFDQWLQIOXHQFHRQ
the soybean and grain complex in South America. In this sense, it is significant that in 2017, 
the already established COFCO was the second largest exporter of grains (including soybean), 
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meal and oil in Argentina, with soybean representing 16% of the total of grains exported, and 
considering that soybean meal and oil have a significant role in these exports (Calzada, 2018; 
Calzada and Di Yenno, 2018). With these two acquisitions, China has expanded its presence 
over this section of the commodity chain, as COFCO becomes one of the key actors in the 
soybean and grains export sector in Argentina.  
A similar strategy has been undertaken by CGG, the grain trading company discussed 
above. Though unable to fund an acquisition, the company opted to form alliances with local 
companies in Brazil and Argentina, as a tactic for ensuring soybean supply. In 2012, it 
developed an agreement with an Argentine food company, Molinos Cañuelas, to produce 
soybean on a 10,000 hectare farm, with an initial investment of US$10 million (Zha and Zhang, 
2013: 468; Bidegaray, 2012). Zha and Zhang (2013) also report that, in addition to their 
attempted acquisition of 200,000 hectares of land in Bahia, Brazil, CGG began lending money 
to soybean producers at a discount rate as support for expanding their production capacity, 
conditional on the purchase of soybeans by CGG at a previously set price.  
Acquisitions and investments have also been pursued in the seed and agrochemical 
industry. These developments demonstrate a tendency towards increasing concentration of 
FDSLWDO LQ WKH DJULFXOWXUDO FRPPRGLWLHV¶ SUoduction chain, with potential consequences for 
production and governance of these different crops, as large biotechnological companies 
develop the capacity to determine production conditions, such as the quality and features of the 
seeds and the herbicides needed for their production. In this restructuring, China has been 
successful thus far in consolidating its place in a market increasingly dominated by a few big 
players, in an effort to avoid being locked out of a key market.  The clearest case of this is the 
acquisition by state-RZQHG FKHPLFDO FRPSDQ\ &KHP&KLQD¶V RI 6\QJHQWD D 6ZLVV EDVHG
agribusiness and seed company that is one of three corporations that controls over half of the 
soy seed market (Oliveira and Hecht, 2016: 255). In October 2017, SIX Swiss Exchange, 
6ZLW]HUODQG¶V SULQFLSDO VWRFN H[FKDQJH DSSURYHG WKH UHTXHVW E\ &KHP&KLQD WR GHOLVW WKH
remaining shares of Syngenta not held by the Chinese company (Syngenta, 2017). This 
operation places China in a leading position in the genetically modified seeds market, as 
Syngenta holds one of the most extensive portfolios of seed varieties in the world (El Pais, 
2016). This move is consistent with the role of Chinese companies in the production and export 
of glyphosate ± the main herbicide used in conjXQFWLRQ ZLWK 0RQVDQWR¶V 5RXQG-up Ready 
soybean seed ± as they produce 40% of the ZRUOG¶VVXSSO\DQGFRQVWLWXWHRIJOREDOH[SRUWV
(Haro Sly, 2017: 6). Glyphosate is also significant in the soybean connection with Argentina, 
as it is one of the leading imports from China to this country (Haro Sly, 2017: 6). The 
completion of this deal also falls into a general trend of restructuring in the global agrochemical 
and seed markets, other examples of which are the merger of Dupont and Dow, and Bayer and 
Monsanto.  
 
Strategy III: Investments in infrastructure and financial support 
 
A third strategy involves lending and investments. As opposed to the operations mentioned 
above, where the projects were designed and implemented by state-owned companies, these 
loans and funds are directly provided by the Chinese government through its development 
banks, namely the China Development Bank (CDB) and the China Export-Import Bank 
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(Eximbank). The role of China in Latin America as a source of loans and finance has been 
increasing significantly in the last fifteen years. Since 2003, loans and credits provided by 
China to the region have amounted to US$113 billion, and in 2015 total bilateral loans 
surpassed that of the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) 
combined (WWF, 2014; Myers et al., 2016). The support provided by Chinese institutions to 
the development of these projects is not a direct mechanism for the control of the soybean 
complex in the region, but rather demonstrates efforts to ensure access to soybean and other 
commodities. By incentivising and funding infrastructure projects, China aims to prevent the 
existence of bottlenecks that might disrupt the transportation and hence supply of resources. 
This is in consonance with the One Belt, One Road project, which aims to develop corridors 
for the movement of commodities and resources to and from China (see Jie, 2017). 
These investments are usually not aimed directly at control over soybean¶VYDOXHFKDLQ
and are not limited to this sector, but in general they involve the facilitation of infrastructure 
projects or the development of industrial facilities linked to natural resources. Nevertheless, 
WKHVHIORZVRIFDSLWDODUHVWLOOOLQNHGWR&KLQD¶VFRQFHUQZLWKWKHXQLQWHUUXSWed provision of 
raw materials, including agricultural as well as mineral and oil resources. In terms of loans 
directed to infrastructure projects, Myers et al. (2016: 2) point out that roadways have been 
prevalent, especially for the transportation of raw materials and commodities. Bolivia, for 
example, received a US$7.5 billion loan from Eximbank for several projects, including a 
highway that is part of the bi-oceanic corridor that will link Chile, Bolivia, and Brazil (McKay 
et al., 2016a: 11). Overall, between 2005 and 2015, 30% of Chinese investments in Latin 
America have been directed towards infrastructure, and in addition to bilateral agreements, 
China has allocated around US$35 billion in special regional funds (Myers et al., 2016). Not 
only that, but China has been increasingly seeking collaboration with the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IADB) in infrastructure investment. Both as a non-lending member of 
,$'%DQGE\GHYHORSLQJFROODERUDWLRQVZLWK([LPEDQNWKH3HRSOH¶V%DQNRI&KLQDDQGWKH
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) (Mendez, 2018). In fact, this organization was 
invited by the IADB to its last annual meeting in Mendoza, Argentina (ibid).  
Although Chinese investment projects can be found across Latin America and the 
Caribbean, a large part of these loans has been concentrated in Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, and 
Venezuela. Indeed, Venezuela figures prominently in the volumes of capital in the form of 
loans and investment that go from China to the region, mainly directed towards the oil industry. 
Similarly, many flows going into Brazil are associated with investments in Petrobras, the 
national oil company. However, there is also a large segment of this capital that is directed to 
projects linked to the soybean sector. For example, the CDB offered a US$2.6 billion loan over 
a 10-year period in 2010 to recondition a cargo rail system that connects Buenos Aires to the 
heartland of the soybean growing area (Kotschwar, Moran & Muir, 2012: 3), and in 2015 the 
Argentine government signed a letter of intention with the China Machinery Corporation to 
double financing for cargo trains (El Cronista, 2015).  
 
6WUDWHJ\,99HWRRIµWHFKQRORJLFDOHYHQWV¶ 
 
A fourth governance strategy deployed by China draws from its leverage as a significant 
consumer of soybeans. As global demand for soybeans and other grains chiefly emanates from 
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China, any decision by this country to halt imports, or impose conditions on the quality of 
JRRGVKDVDQ LPSDFWRQH[SRUWLQJFRXQWULHV7KLVFRXQWU\¶VGHFLVLRQ WRDSSURYH - or delay 
approval - of technological events (a term used by agricultural producers to refer to specific 
genetic modifications to certain seed species), including specific genetically modified (GM) 
varieties of soybean and other crops, can determine whether a soybean cargo is accepted or 
rejected, generating a significant loss to exporters. The mismatch in timing between the use of 
certain biotechnologies and their approval by Chinese authorities creates disruptions to the 
international trade of commodities that, for countries that are highly dependent on these 
exports, such as Brazil, Argentina, and other South American economies, can become a source 
of strain.  
&KLQD¶VGHPDQGFDSDFLW\ thus has the ability to (dis)incentivise the use of certain GM 
varieties, pesticides, and agrochemicals. This means that it can extend its governance over the 
biotechnological sphere of the agricultural economy. This kind of control over the content and 
quality of grains can be problematic for countries that have agricultural production zones near 
shared borders, which can be very permeable to new generations of seeds and pesticides. As 
one interviewee put it:   
 
Soybean is not a hybrid [seed]. If you approve an event and Brazil does not, 
there will probably be filtrations through the borders, and vice versa. If China does 
not approve something, for example, then for any reason your boat can be stopped 
because there are traces of an event not approved by China. We need common 
policies for sanitation purposes, etc.7 
 
There have been several instances in which China has rejected cargoes of soybean, corn 
or other grains based on sanitary reasons or on finding traces of GM varieties that had not been 
approved by Chinese authorities. For example, in 2004, Brazilian soybean shipments were 
UHMHFWHG IRU FRQWDLQLQJ µXQDFFHSWDEO\ KLJK OHYHO RI VHHGV WUHDWHG ZLWK IXQJLFLGHV¶ )RRG
Chemical News, 2004). Around 150 thousand tonnes of soybean were turned away, which led 
to a temporary ban on imports of the oilseed from Brazil by the Chinese Quality Agency (La 
Prensa, 2004). Similarly, the US has encountered several obstacles to the trade of corn and 
soybean with China, with numerous cargoes having been rejected in 2013 and 2014 after tests 
found presence of GM strains that had not been approved by Chinese authorities (ValorSoja, 
2013; Durisin and Wilson, 2014).8  
$QDGGLWLRQDOGLPHQVLRQWR&KLQD¶VµYHWRRIWHFKQRORJLFDOHYHQWV¶VWUDWHJ\LVGHYHORSLQJ
the capacity to use soybean as leverage to advance interests in other areas on a country-by-
country basis. For example, in 2016, China suspended imports of soybean oil from Argentina, 
a decision that was suspected to be in retaliation for the decision by Argentinian President 
0DFUL¶V JRYHUQPHQW WR VXVSHQG WKH FRQVWUXFWLRQ RI WZR GDPV E\ D &KLQHVH FRPSDQ\ WKH
Gezhouba Group, which had been approved and started by the preceding Kirchner government 
(Notinac, 2016; Centenera, 2017). More recently, in April 2018&KLQD¶VSODQWRLPSRVHWDULIIV
on US VR\EHDQLPSRUWVLQUHVSRQVHWR3UHVLGHQW7UXPS¶VSURSRVHGWDULIIVRQ&KLQHVHJRRGV
GHPRQVWUDWHVWKDWZKLOHWKHFRXQWU\KDVDµVWUDWHJLFGHSHQGHQFH¶RQWKHVXSSO\RIWKLVRLOVHHG
it is nevertheless willing to wield its power in the global trade system (Meyersohn, 2018). 
These recent developments indicate that China is increasingly exercising its capacity to use its 
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very uneven trade pattern with South American to expand its dominance over the 
biotechnological sphere of the soybean complex as a sanction with which to extend its 
influence over other strategic economic areas. 
In response to these policies, agricultural producers have developed cooperation 
mechanisms in order to define common positions on certain issues, with the aim of contesting 
the monopoly power wielded by China. As the quote above indicates, this is necessary if 
producers are to find common ground in respect to the use of biotechnology and their 
relationships with China. As part of the efforts to achiHYHWKLVPDQ\SURGXFHUV¶DVVRFLDWLRQV
have organised around the International Soybean Growers Alliance (ISGA), which unites 
representatives from Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Paraguay, the US, and Uruguay. As a member 
of the Paraguay Chamber of Oilseed produFHUVFRPPHQWHGµ,6*$LVLPSRUWDQWWRGHIHQGRXU
WUDGHDW WKHZRUOGOHYHODQGDYRLGDV\QFKURQ\ LQWKHDSSURYDORIWHFKQRORJLFDOHYHQWV¶9 In 
2014, the association organised its first mission to China, where they discussed with the 
Chinese Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) the problems of only holding biotechnological 
approvals once a year, as had been the standard practice of the MoA since 2012 (ASA 2014). 
By reducing the frequency with which these events are authorised, the Chinese MoA has the 
capacity to disturb trade as well as the agrochemical and seeds market.  
The challenge for South American countries is to find a strategy that will turn their ability 
IRUFRRSHUDWLRQDQGWKHLUH[WHQVLYHFDSDFLW\WRPHHW&KLQD¶VLQFUHDVLQJGHPDQGIRUVR\DQG
other crops, LQWROHYHUDJHDJDLQVW&KLQD¶VGRPLQDWLRQRIWKHLQGXVWU\$VDIRUPHU$UJHQWLQLDQ
6HFUHWDU\RI$JULFXOWXUHH[SODLQHGµ,IDOOIRXUFRXQWULHVJHWWRJHWKHUDQGVD\³ZHZLOOQRWVHOO
WR&KLQDIRUD\HDU´&KLQDH[SORGHV%XWWKDWLVRQO\LIZHJRDOOWRJHWKHr. If we go separately, 
>&KLQD@ZLOOEX\IURP%UD]LODQGQRW IURP$UJHQWLQDDQGVRRQ¶10 Private Latin American 
initiatives, such as ISGA or the MERCOSOJA conferences gathering soybean producers from 
the Mercosur region are attempting to shift the governance of the agricultural value chain 
WRZDUGVWKHVXSSO\HQGDVDVWUDWHJ\IRUFRXQWHULQJ&KLQD¶VSRZHULQGHWHUPLQLQJWKHUXOHVDQG
conditions for the production and trade of soybean worldwide.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The growing role of China as a global economic actor has attracted much attention from 
academics and policymakers alike. In particular, the increasing presence of China in Latin 
$PHULFDDQGLWVSRVLWLRQLQJDVRQHRIWKHUHJLRQ¶VPDLQWUDGLQJSDUWQHUVKDVUaised questions 
over the mutually beneficial nature of this relationship. By analysing the case of soybean, this 
article explored the political economy of dependency between China and Latin America. 
&KLHIO\GULYHQE\&KLQHVHGHPDQG6RXWK$PHULFD¶VSURGXFWion of soybean has been rapidly 
and drastically increasing over the last fifteen years, becoming consolidated as one of the most 
profitable economic sectors, particularly in Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay. The main driver 
of global demand for soybean has EHHQ&KLQD¶VQHHGWRVDWLVI\LWVSRSXODWLRQ¶VFKDQJLQJIRRG
habits. In this sense, soybean embodies the special economic connection between these 
countries.  
 However, this article has argued that, in order to understand the full extent of these 
asymmetric relations, it is necessary to move beyond the observation of a trade imbalance 
between South America and China. Relations of dependency have expanded beyond trade 
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composition, as China has attempted to increase its influence over different sectors of the 
soybean complex. A closer look at China-Latin America relations through the lens of 
dependency analysis has proven effective in problematizing the discourse of South-South 
Cooperation and positive current account balances, as well as highlighting imbalances 
underpinning the asymmetric relations at play. Yet trade should not be understood as the cause 
of this core-periphery dynamic, but rather as a reflection of the satellization of economies in 
South America. 
 This article has examined four strategies with which China, through state-owned 
companies and financial support from its development banks, has expanded its influence over 
key segments of the soybean value chain. By increasing its efforts to access arable land in 
soybean-producing countries, consolidating its presence in the input and trading section of the 
value chain, facilitating infrastructure projects and using conditional loans to purchase goods 
at a favourable price, and exercising its veto power over technological events, China has 
created a multi-scalar approach to ensure its access to soybean at a controlled price, and to 
incentivise the processing of grains within its own borders. Further on, there are elements that 
suggest that China has intentions to expand its capacity to govern pricing power through the 
trading of commodity futures (Bloomberg News, 2017). This would allow China to challenge 
&KLFDJR¶VGRPLQDQFHDVDSULFH-setting actor and to have more control over the soy market. 
The efforts by China to secure access and influence over the soybean complex have been met 
with resistance. The stalling of land purchasing operations due to opposition from local 
populations and NGOs, legislation limiting foreign access to land, or the creation of 
cooperation mechanisms by regional producers to betWHU FRQIURQW &KLQD¶V SK\WRVDQLWDU\
demands are some examples of this.  
 The soybean link between China and Latin America has important implications for our 
understanding of dependency relations in the current global order. As this article has shown, 
the dynamics of dependency between core and periphery cannot be reduced to country-to-
country trade. In fact, the latest commodity supercycle has allowed South American countries 
to experience exceptional rates of growth and technological upgrading while relying on the 
export of primary goods, which does not chime well with traditional conceptions of 
underdevelopment (Kaplinsky and Farooki, 2017; Perez Caldentey and Vernengo, 2017). For 
example, the increasingly capital-intensive nature of agricultural production, which includes 
the rising use of machinery and bio-genetic technologies, has transformed Brazil into an 
µDJULEXVLQHVV SRZHUKRXVH¶ HQKDQFLQJ LWV UROH LQ WKH JOREDO SROLWLFDO HFRQRP\ +RSHZHOO
2017). This suggests that a focus on the composition of trade alone is no longer sufficient to 
understand how new mechanisms of dependency are reproduced in the Global South. An 
analysis of China-Latin America relations through a dependency theory lens should focus on 
the processes determining technology dependence which consequently lock countries in to 
export-oriented development. 
By analysing the strategies utilised by China throughout the soybean value chain, and 
consequently unpacking what superficially appears to be an asymmetric exchange of goods, 
this article has highlighted the different ways in which Chinese-South American relations of 
dependency have limited WKHODWWHU¶Vcapacity for autonomous development. This phenomenon 
should provoke scholars to rethink the nature of relations of dependency in the global political 
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economy and to enquire as to the implications these transformations have for dependency 
theory.  
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NOTES 
 
1. This article builds on a research project on the political economy of soybean production 
and trade in South America. While the scope of the project limited the possibility of 
extended fieldwork in China, the interviews conducted in Argentina, Brazil and 
Paraguay provide insights into the role of China and Chinese companies in the soybean 
value chain from the perspective of actors in South America.   
2. These impacts have been conceptualised by several authors as inherent to the new 
model of accumulation dominant in the region, termed neo-extractivism (see Veltmeyer 
and Petras, 2014; Gudynas, 2009). This model is marked by the resource-led 
development ± and resource-dependency ± that the region has adopted. Neo-extractivist 
analyses focus more on the role of the Latin American state in enhancing or preventing 
the expansion of this model, while dependency theory ± the theoretical framework this 
article focuses on ± DOORZVDVWXG\RIWKHJOREDOSROLWLFDOHFRQRP\G\QDPLFVWKDWµORFN¶
global south countries in relations of dependency. 
3. Interview at GV AGRO, Sao Paulo, 2014. For a thorough and complete account of this 
process, please see Motta, 2016.  
4. Even if GM seeds were not officially approved by the Brazilian and Paraguayan 
government until later, GM varieties of soybean had been growing in these countries. 
This was due to contraband of these seeds from Argentina, where the absence of royalty 
SD\PHQWV PDGH HDVLHU IRU IDUPHUV WR VHOO ZKDW ZDV NQRZQ DV WKH µZKLWH EDJ¶ DQ
additional bag of seeds from the harvest to be used as seed input for the following 
season (see Gras and Hernández, 2016; Ezquerro-Cañete, 2016).  
5. For a detailed ethnographic account of the Battle of the Beans see Oliveira, 2018b. 
6. Interview at Molinos Rio de la Plata, Argentine crushing company, in Buenos Aires, 
October 2014; Interview at Union de Gremios de la Production, union of agricultural 
producers of Paraguay, in Asuncion, October 2014; Interview at Brazilian Association 
of Vegetable Oils Industries, in São Paulo, November 2014. 
7. Interview at Bolsa de Cereales of Buenos Aires, Buenos Aires, 2014. 
28 
 
8. One of the problematic varieties belonged to Syngenta, so the recent acquisition of this 
company by a Chinese corporation might change some of these dynamics in the future. 
9. Interview at Association of Grains and Oilseed Traders of Paraguay, Asuncion, 2014. 
10. Interview at Argentine Council for International Relations, Buenos Aires, 2014. 
 
 
